THE NEW REPUBLIC

UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT
NOV 30 1959
LIBRARY

Spain Under Franco

by Ian Gilmour

November 30, 1959, 25 cents

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

T.R.B. *from Washington*

Deficit President

★ General Eisenhower came into office determined to show up the spendthrift Democrats by balancing the budget. Last week he was down at the Augusta golf course anxiously working on his final budget. Here is the record so far – for fiscal years ending June 30, with figures in billions:

1954 –	$3.1	deficit
1955 –	4.2	deficit
1956 –	1.6	surplus
1957 –	1.6	surplus
1958 –	2.8	deficit
1959 –	12.5	deficit
1960 –	.1	deficit (est.)

(We omit 1953 because overlapping fiscal years divide responsibility with the Democrats.)

You will see that in the key role of "fiscal responsibility" Eisenhower has failed. There have been four deficits out of the six years. Another is coming up. The 1959 deficit was the largest in peacetime. You can see why Eisenhower is now so desperately determined to try to block the up-coming deficit, even if it means cutting education, defense, space programs or what have you.

The little table is really worth studying. It tells so much. Nobody since Hoover has had such simple faith in fiscal orthodoxy. Yet the Eisenhower red ink so far is $19.4 billion. Why? First of all Eisenhower's advisers misjudged two recessions: 1953-54, 57-58.

George Humphrey took office with a doctrinaire belief that Truman was heading the nation into runaway inflation. He slammed on the economic brakes. Actually a decline had already begun and this turned it into a slump. The slump helped give Eisenhower his first two deficits in fiscal '54 and '55.

Slow recovery followed and again the Administration became obsessed with inflation. As early as May, 1956, economist Sumner Slichter warned: "If the Reserve System is not to throttle the growth of the economy, a major modification in Reserve policy will be needed before the end of the year." Warnings went unheeded. Again the Administration throttled the nation into recession – with two more deficits.

There are in general three main ways for a nation to get a surplus: (1) higher taxes; (2) the same taxes but a growth prosperity that makes tax yield higher; and (3) cutting expenditures.

Many think the Soviet threat justifies higher taxes. But this would require a type of leadership and willingness to risk unpopularity that Eisenhower has never offered. The second method is the least painful – growth. Unfortunately the GOP policies have inhibited economic growth. Allen Dulles is only the latest to warn that the rate of Soviet economic and industrial growth is twice ours. The third policy is the one Eisenhower has invariably followed: slash expenditures. It is negative. The population is growing 3 million a year, yet the Administration tries to thrust the child's foot back into last year's shoe. Cut defense, cut education, cut foreign aid but balance the budget! The irony of it is that after cutting all these things we may still be in the red. Something really seems to be wrong somewhere.

Which One, Mister?

★ An editorial we saw in the tabloid *Washington News*, November 12, keeps nagging our conscience. Lloyd Barenblatt, a young, decent-looking former Vassar College psychology instructor is locked up in jail here starting a six months' term for contempt of Congress. Five years ago (yes, five) he refused to tell a House Un-American Activities Subcommittee whether he was, or ever had been, a Communist. He didn't plead the 5th Amendment. He just said the questions violated his constitutional rights under the First Amendment. Well, four judges on the appeals courts and four on the Supreme Court agreed with Barenblatt; but in each case five judges didn't. It was close, but he's in jail.

Now, says this editorial, look at another young man. Unlike Barenblatt this one was a liar and a cheat. He helped hoax the American public. He made big money and, so far as anybody knows, kept it. He took false oath before a grand jury; assumed a sanctimonious air until he was cornered by a subpoena and then made a maudlin confession before a weeping committee. "I think you have a great future ahead of you – God bless you!" lachrymose chairman Oren Harris of the committee told him. That's the contrasting story of the two. And which would you rather be, Mister; in jail now with Barenblatt or out free with the other young man?

Notes

★ Always eager to keep clients informed we suggest writing to the *Fund for the Republic*, 60 East 42 Street, New York, for a free copy of "The Art of Government," a pamphlet by James Reichley, who has written for this journal. Primarily it's the case history of reform and organization politics in Philadelphia, but it goes much deeper. Why is the reform drive in Philadelphia petering out? Why do such drives always peter out? Reichley thinks maybe it's the Protestant middle-class "philosophy of individualism" that looks down its nose at party politics and finds expression, instead, in service clubs. A stimulating study; the Fund will send single copies without charge.

Fascinated as always by our esteemed contemporary *Time*, we note that between discoveries of "new" Eisenhowers it is now complaining (Oct. 19) that there are "still no detectable signs of urgency" over the space lag; and that "the bulk of the blame" can't be put on any one person "except perhaps the man whose responsibility it is to boss the whole show: President Eisenhower."

How in the world did we ever get the impression that when Eisenhower provided a pillow, *Time* put its head on it? *Time* exulted November 4, 1957 (after Sputnik): "Leadership had begun to reassert itself." On November 18, 1957 – "There was still confusion on details [after the Eisenhower speech] but it was the healthy kind of confusion that comes from bustling activity." And in the same euphoric vein, February 17, 1958, it found "even the week's snarls and snaps were comforting . . . [they signaled] that the nation was at least gearing up for the conquest."

More healthy confusion, *Time*, please.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Opinion Volume 141 Number 22 Issue 2350 November 30, 1959*
Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, *1244 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D.C. Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at Washington, D.C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy 25c. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Advertising rates upon request. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Include old and new address.* *Copyright © 1959, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.*

Those Cranberries

THE WEEK

3. Those Cranberries; "What Is To Be Done?"; Defense and the Dollar; The French Bomb; Non-Commercial TV; Insecurity in Numbers

ARTICLES

8. The Social Democrats Choose Moderation by Terence Prittie

9. The Superficial Aspect by Gerald W. Johnson

10. Spain Under Franco by Ian Gilmour

DEPARTMENTS

19. Books 22. Movies

23. Correspondence

THE STAFF

Gilbert A. Harrison, Editor & Publisher
Helen Fuller, Managing Editor
Selig S. Harrison, Associate Editor
Robert Evett, Books & the Arts Editor
F. R. Ruskin, Assistant to the Publisher

Contributing Editors: Frank Getlein, B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe, Christopher Jencks, Gerald W. Johnson, Stanley Kauffmann, James E. King, Jr., Helen Hill Miller, Louis H. Pollak, Howard Simons, Michael Straight

How bold the usually placatory Arthur S. Flemming was in standing up to the solid phalanx of the cranberry industry – distraught at the prospect of a $40-$50 million crop loss. How resolute the Presidential candidates who pledged eternal fealty to the cranberry cause in *le vin du pays*. How loyal to his producer constituents was Ezra Taft Benson who didn't wait for all the facts to come in before siding with them against the consumers in pursuit of "pure" sauce for the holiday bird.

But what was it all about? Was the "cranberry episode," as the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare called it, another Salk vaccine blunder? The evidence indicates the opposite. The Pure Food and Drug Act requires Secretary Flemming to protect the public from food products that are tainted or adulterated. That job is growing harder every month as the use of new chemical pesticides, additives and colorants – some of them highly toxic and not fully understood by scientists – create massive new problems. And Flemming's Department finds itself up against three large obstacles in dealing with them: authority within the government is divided; recent additions to the basic Food and Drug laws are unworkable; the Eisenhower retrenchment policy prevents adequate enforcement by the regulatory agencies. To change the situation, the public and the Congress had first to be made aware of these dangers and difficulties. The cranberry episode proved to be a relatively painless way to begin that education.

When the Food and Drug Administration was taken out of the Department of Agriculture 20 years ago, most of the inspection powers over food were left behind. The result is such anomalies as appeared in the cranberry controversy where the Department of Agriculture approves a product – in this case an aminotriazole weedkiller – while the Food and Drug Administration alerts the public to the danger of foods containing its residue.

Conflicts between the government departments have been inevitable and are increasing. Those whose livelihood is in farming are eager for every new chemical aid industry can provide to control insects and weeds. Since insects develop immunity to many poisons in a short time, the chemical companies are constantly producing more potent killers and farmers are using them – with Department of Agriculture encouragement. Last year, for example, Agriculture Department agents sprayed large areas of Alabama and Georgia from the air with dieldrin and heptachlor in a drive to kill off the imported fire ant. This month the Food and Drug Administration reported that heptachlor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forms a dangerous derivative on crops treated with it and severely restricted its use.

Congress had to intervene before responsibility for determining the health hazards of radiation to man – divided between the Atomic Energy Commission and FDA – were consolidated in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare last year. By spotlighting the cranberry case as he has done, Secretary Flemming may have paved the way for similar centralization of authority in the case of food safety. Yet even with authority centered in a single agency the task of policing the revolutionized food field would be monumental. To make it more manageable Flemming's Department went to Congress last year and asked for two basic reforms in the Food and Drug law: (1) They wanted power to regulate additives in foodstuffs – previously the law referred only to adulteration, and the courts were holding color additives, for instance, not to be adulterants. (2) They wanted the burden of proof shifted from the government to the producer. Before using an additive, industry would have to demonstrate that it was safe. FDA then had to wait until its suspicions were aroused and then had to prove its case in court.

FDA got what it wanted. The additives amendments went through late in the 1958 session. But first, Rep. James Delaney (D, N.Y.) added an amendment stating that any substance shown to cause cancer *under any conditions* would be banned *absolutely*. This is the only absolute ban in the law. For other additives, which may be harmful in certain quantities, FDA may set tolerance levels – relative amounts that may be eaten safely. (The cranberry people have pointed out that it is impossible for a man to eat enough aminotriazole – even over a lifetime – to suffer a rat's fate.) As a result of the Delaney amendment the FDA may soon be forced to create pandemonium in the food industry by outlawing perhaps hundreds of additives, although scientists believe them safe in quantities now used. (Technically any interstate truck load of cigarettes is liable to seizure on the basis of findings of traces of cancer-causing substances.)

By March, 1960, FDA must approve 150 more chemical additives, and the Delaney amendment makes meeting this deadline practically impossible. But as one of the highest HEW officials said privately the week before the cranberry story broke, "We can't go up on the Hill and testify in favor of cancer!" The front-page cranberry stories were a warning to the rest of the food industry that it would have to persuade Congress to remove the Delaney amendment quietly or face the same consequences. Trade papers since report that lipstick and pesticide manufacturers have received the message and are preparing for battle.

The cranberry story has also served to undercut one spend-less drive of the Bureau of the Budget and is almost certain to guarantee that pure food enforcement will be given more funds next year.

"What Is To Be Done?"

"On that day when the non-Communist world taken as a whole finds the way in which it can outrun the Communist world in the rate of economic growth without using totalitarian means, Communism will be defeated – and until then it will not." This quotation, from a *New Republic* article, published on the cover of *The New Republic* for April 29, 1957, was subsequently selected by the fluent and brilliant American economist, J. K. Galbraith, in his provocative book, *The Affluent Society*, as a prime example of how, in what he called "the conventional wisdom," production had become a fetish.

"In the years following World War II," he wrote, "nothing had such massive standing in the conventional wisdom as the proposition that there is a direct correlation between national power and economic output. National power and therewith defensive capability and external security increased *pari passu* with increases in the gross national product. A country with a higher rate of increase was on the way to ultimate victory." Galbraith then went on to demolish these alleged theses of the conventional wisdom.

But –

There *is* a correlation, direct or more complex, between national power and economic output. There *is* a relationship between on the one hand national power, defense capability and external security and on the other hand gross national product. It may not be a simple relationship but it is there. And, in fact, a country with a higher rate of increase *is* on the way to ultimate victory – provided it can keep this up for a long enough period and knows what to do with what it produces. "The conventional wisdom" has some justification here. Economic growth is universally recognized as an expression of the vitality of a country or a system.

To put this concretely, it is important for the survival of the United States that it continue to outproduce the Soviet Union. That it is also equally important for the survival of the United States that it know how to use what it produces for the most effective protection of its own security does not diminish the importance of production and productivity.

It is with a realization of the actual importance of production and productivity for security and survival that the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, under its chairman, Rep. Richard Bolling (D, Mo.), has launched its investigation of the relative standing of the United States and the Soviet Union in the production race. The hearings deserve to have the kind of attention that the TV hearings have been getting, for Bolling's group is dealing with essentials while the TV hearings deal essentially with frills. It is a strange society which finds its entertainment more interesting than its survival.

The Bolling subcommittee has got straight talk from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Allen Dulles on the dangers of allowing the Soviet Union further to narrow the gap between itself and the US in industrial production. It has also got some soothing syrup of the type passed out in the report the subcommittee published by C. Warren Nutter of the University of Virginia, which declared that there is no definitive evidence that the Soviet economic system has been able to generate more rapid industrial growth over the long run than the traditional private enterprise system of the West – a conclusion which the author quickly qualified by stating that in terms of ability to generate sheer growth the Soviet system had proved itself to be "more or less" the equal of the market economy exemplified by the US

Everyone is now in the act so far as estimating Soviet economic growth is concerned. Not so long ago the Research Department of the National Association of Manufacturers put out a report which declared that Soviet economic growth is going to slow down, but which failed to emphasize that it would have to slow down a great deal indeed to descend to the level of American economic growth.

But the facts are not so obscure. They are that:

1. The rate of economic growth of the United States is only a fraction of that of the Soviet Union.

2. This situation projected only a few years ahead – to 1965 or 1970 – poses grave dangers to American economic predominance in the world, and to the national security of our country, Galbraith to the contrary notwithstanding.

The problem then becomes, to borrow a title from a Russian political philosopher: "What Is To Be Done?"

This, unfortunately, is not a question which the Bolling subcommittee will be taking up. The United States, nevertheless, is going to have to take it up – and soon.

Defense and the Dollar

Military expenditures for the first fiscal year of the Eisenhower Administration, were $40.3 billion. In the meantime, inflation, which is greater for major items of military equipment than the general inflationary rise, has increased military costs at the rate of about four percent a year. The price of new and constantly more complex weapons has caused a further decrease in what the military dollar will buy. Allowing for inflation, it would require $50.4 billion today to buy the same defense as was bought for $40.3 billion in 1954. Expressed another way, a 1960 expenditure of $40.9 billion (which is about what will be spent) will buy the same amount of defense that $32.8 billion would have bought in 1954. While military expenditures have been held to an almost constant dollar level by the Administration since 1954, civil expenditures have increased $10.5 billion.

During this period, also, the public has constantly been assured that the United States is growing stronger and stronger. But for the first time, under close questioning by Chairman George Mahon (D, Tex.) of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee this year, Secretary of Defense McElroy admitted that relatively the US is growing weaker, "but only relatively." How relatively? Well, the manpower of the armed forces has decreased since 1954, from about 3.5 million to slightly fewer than 2.5 million. The capacity to fight limited wars, with or without atomic weapons, has been neglected in favor of the one-weapon theory of massive retaliation with nuclear bombers and missiles.

New appropriations, or new obligational authority for fiscal year 1961 as distinguished from money actually spent, are certain to be reduced. (About half of the new appropriation each year is spent during the year, while about half for procurement of long lead-time equipment and construction is spent over a period of up to four years. Hence the budget document covers both appropriations and expenditures. Expenditure indicates the drain on the treasury while new appropriation gives authority for long-term contracts and authorizes the funds that are spent during the year for such items as pay, travel, supplies, *etc.*) This reduction in '61 is possible to some extent because the rigid limitation on military expenditure practiced during recent years has resulted in an unobligated carryover of funds from year to year, mostly in the Air Force. The Air Force, consequently, will be the principal victim in the request for new appropriations.

The President, McElroy said upon his return from Augusta last week, had examined the more costly projects and programs carefully. He disapproved construction of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier for which a starting appropriation of $35 million had been made by Congress for the current fiscal year. Instead, he insisted on a conventionally-powered carrier, such as he had recommended the previous year, at a saving of $120 million. Major projects and programs whose fate still appears uncertain are the B-58 medium-bomber program, the Bomarc-B interceptor missile, the SAGE air-defense-control system and the Titan ICBM. An ultimate saving of several billion dollars could be achieved by their cancellations. The justification for cancellation in the case of the B-58 and the Titan is questionable, but Bomarc and additional SAGE support for it are now marginal projects that have been made obsolescent.

It was inevitable that the relative military power of the US would decrease as the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear weapons and the means – bombers and missiles – to deliver them. But it was not inevitable that the US should allow the Soviet Union to overtake and pass it in nuclear striking power, as it will soon, while at the same time the Russians maintained their massive superiority in ground forces, both in numbers of men and in modern equipment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The French Bomb

Statements by President de Gaulle, and Premier Debré's speech on the French military budget, have made it clear that the forthcoming nuclear test explosion in the Sahara is not just a symbolic gesture intended to boost national prestige, but the first step in a long-term program whose purpose is to make France fully independent of her allies in the military field. Considering the worldwide fear of radioactive fallout and the prolonged negotiations with the British and Russians on a cessation of nuclear testing, the unconcern in Washington over the French decision is remarkable. On the recent UN resolution put forth by India, calling upon all nations to desist from further testing, the US abstained. The Administration has been unable to decide either to resist actively the enlargement of the nuclear club, or, on the other hand, to seek an amendment of the McMahon Act so as to permit this country's making available to France atomic weapons we have already tested.

The *Times* of London has gone so far as to say that there is no longer any point in NATO's trying to work out a system for joint control of an allied nuclear deterrent since this could not possibly divert De Gaulle from his prime aim of giving France nuclear independence. The *Times* wonders if a nuclear test ban is still feasible, now that France has said in advance that she will not accept one except on conditions which are both physically and politically impossible.

Yet, there is some reason to believe that the cost of producing an effective deterrent will ultimately force France to think again about her nuclear arms program – as has already happened in Britain. M. Debré told the National Assembly that the French bombs would be carried in 50 Mirage jet bombers, which will not start coming off the production line until 1963. Quite apart from the fact that manned aircraft flying at only twice the speed of sound may be unable to penetrate the missile defenses which Russia will possess within four years, the airfields from which they must take off will be totally vulnerable to surprise attack by Soviet missiles. Thus the French nuclear force will be useless unless it strikes the first blow. But it is difficult to imagine any French Government deciding to launch a surprise attack on Russia when it knows that the consequence must be the total annihilation of the whole of France by Soviet missiles before the slower French nuclear aircraft have reached their targets.

Thus, in spite of everything being said by French leaders, economic factors will probably force the French Government to look for alternatives to its nuclear arms policy. It is therefore vital that the other members of NATO should have a rational alternative ready when that time comes. Moreover even if, as President De Gaulle told the *Ecole Militaire*, France herself is no longer prepared to cooperate in an integrated NATO defense system, there is every reason for the other NATO powers to integrate their defenses as closely as possible. Otherwise the example of nuclear independence already set by Britain and France is certain to be followed by Western Germany, Italy and perhaps some smaller NATO countries too.

France would regret the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries as much as her predecessors in the nuclear arms race regret their spread to France. M. Perrin, the French High Commissioner for Atomic Energy, himself admitted in a talk to a group of foreign journalists on November 17th, that the risks of war by accident would increase as more countries came to possess nuclear arms. The French decision to seek nuclear independence, far from weakening the case for a worldwide nuclear test ban and for greater integration of defense in NATO, therefore strengthens the case for both.

Non-Commercial TV

Even the Federal Communications Commission, so long the lazy lap-dog of the broadcasting industry, can be made to bark if its tail is pulled hard enough. Mr. John C. Doerfer, chairman of the FCC, told 200 top television executives last week that they had better do something about "distasteful forms of deception" and the "indiscriminate hawking of wares." The executives gave him a standing ovation. They know the difference between a bark and a bite.

But the discriminating viewer knows that the trouble with television is not the quiz shows or the exaggerated advertising so much as the vapid programming. It is the scarcity of shows that can be watched with pleasure and profit by adults and by children. The FCC has shown little comprehension of that problem, nor can it be assumed that the problem will be explored in depth at the FCC hearings scheduled for December 7.

But Congress can, if it chooses, pump some variety, intelligence and taste in TV channels. And it can do this without breaking one single free-enterprise dolly.

Since 1952, 45 ETV stations have gone on the air, sustained by small budgets and high ideals. And there are 214 additional channels set aside for new ETV stations that can be built whenever the will and the funds appear in sufficient amounts. Most of these unused channels are in the Ultra High Frequency spectrum. To receive UHF programs, sets have to be adapted, but adaptation costs only about $40, which is not an exorbitant price for having something worth seeing every day. Fifty-six of the unused ETV channels are in the Very High Frequency (or "commercial") band, available to ordinary sets.

How are the 45 ETV stations now operating financed? It depends largely on who sponsors them, and there are three types of sponsors. Funds for public school sta-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions, such as those in Cincinnati and Louisville, come primarily from the education budget. University stations such as Ohio State's WOSU or the newest ETV station, Miami University's MUB, are financed by the universities. Finally, there are the community stations (WGBH in Boston, WTTW in Chicago, KQED in San Francisco) which are sustained by door-to-door solicitation, foundation grants and help from educational, cultural and civic interests. None of these stations have budgets comparable to commercial TV. The total annual operating cost of the station in Gainesville, Florida, is approximately $45,000; an "expensive" station (Chicago) has yearly operating costs of about $750,000.

In the last session of Congress, the Senate passed with little notice the Magnuson bill which would authorize $1 million for each of the 50 states for educational television, largely for construction of facilities. Rep. Stewart Udall (D, Ariz.) introduced a companion bill in the House but it never reached a floor vote. A Congressional subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee has been holding hearings across the country on several bills, and a member of the subcommittee has said the hearings showed growing public demand for ETV. He believes there is wide agreement that present channels should continue to be reserved, and that if federal aid is extended it should be in the form of matching grants and should pass through some local screening agency rather than being given directly by the federal government to the local stations.

Thanks in part to Mr. Van Doren, who may have helped the cause of education more than he imagines, the iron is hot, though the Administration remains cool. ("We have no information," the Department of Health, Education and Welfare told Senator Magnuson last year, "indicating that a federal program is necessary to assure continuing development of educational television.") But if Congress acts, it can help bring to millions of people a new kind of ad-free programming – programming that sees children as more than potential salesmen of krispies and krunchies, and see adults as other than idiots.

Insecurity in Numbers

One evening earlier this month, at 10 o'clock, CBS presented an hour-long documentary report entitled "The Population Explosion." The program began with the announcement that this was "a controversial subject" and that the late hour had been deliberately chosen since what was to follow was "other than general family entertainment." What followed certainly was not entertaining, but as the hour progressed one could seriously wonder wherein the controversy lay. The facts seemed incontrovertible. There is an annual increase in the world's population, Howard K. Smith informed us, of 49 million; in a few centuries, if the present birth rate continues, there will be only one square yard per person on the globe.

India, whose population of 400 million is expected to double before the end of the century, was used as the illustrative example. One saw horrifying pictures of homeless and malnourished Indians (at least one-fourth of the population is ill-housed, two-thirds are hungry). Government officials and prominent citizens all agreed that birth control was the only solution, but few were optimistic about the government's program. One spokesman explained that though the people faithfully attended the government-sponsored lectures on family planning, he was afraid "they came only to watch the swells." "The people say it is all in the hands of God," said a doctor, "how can you argue with them?" The Minister of Housing said he felt edgy about China's growing population (680 million), noting that its birth-control program had been, unaccountably, dropped. Prime Minister Nehru hoped that a simple and cheap method would soon be developed. Lady Rama Rau said that imagination was needed to solve the problem. "But governments, you know, have no imagination at all."

The last portion of the program was taken up by two American clergymen, Msgr. Irving De Blanc, head of the Catholic Family Life Bureau in Washington and the Rt. Reverend James A. Pike, Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of California, who represented their respective churches on the subject of birth control. Msgr. De Blanc said that the Catholic Church was opposed to birth control and gave the orthodox reasons, though he added one that is seldom heard: that contraceptive devices "degrade women." He ended with a prayer that someone would come along soon and invent a contraceptive that was "morally acceptable."

Bishop Pike was more like folks, but no more illuminating. He said that his church had nothing against family planning, but mind you it had nothing against the Catholic position either. He said he was proud to be an American. (The Monsignor had said he was proud to be an American too. "Thank *God* for the Constitution!" he declared.) And the program ended with the announcement that 5,000 babies had been born in America during the hour.

THE FACTS ABOUT NIXON

William Costello's "unauthorized biography" will be resumed next week with an account of Richard Nixon's two-term performance in the House

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BONN

The Social Democrats Choose Moderation

A year ago it did not look as if the 10 years spent in the political wilderness of Parliamentary opposition had sharpened the wits of the German Social Democrats. Having fought three elections running, and lost them, on the ticket of German reunification and a relaxation of tension in Europe, the Social Democrats had apparently forgotten that their true road to the hearts of the voters lay through the development and propagation of progressive and attractive domestic policies.

The first sign of a return to political understanding came at the end of 1957, when the party entrusted its executive with the task of preparing a new "basic program" in the domestic field. That program will be laid before the next party congress, in the autumn of 1960. The Social Democrats intend to be ready to fight the 1961 federal election – this time with the right weapons.

They know that the days of "class warfare" are over. The working-man wants, first and foremost, to earn good money and spend it. The Trade Union leaders already drive cars as large and luxurious as those of the bosses of West German industry. Workers, admittedly, want a larger share in the nation's wealth, and greater material security. But they want to be sure, too, that a Social Democratic Government of the future would be able to pay for these things without reducing the impetus of German economic expansion. The program which will win votes, and not just hold on to the traditionally Social Democratic section of the community, must be practical as well as progressive.

A study of the "basic program" and an interview with the Deputy-Chairman of the party, Herr Waldemar von Knoeringen, have served to underline the following features of the new thinking. The very word "nationalization" has been dropped from the Social Democratic vocabulary. So has "socialization," its more restrained equivalent. Instead, the Social Democrats talk about "a suitable system of public ownership," "industrial balance" and a growth in the power of the community. But it will specifically not entail the building-up of the power of the State and of bureaucratic control of industry.

Public ownership will, in turn, be restricted to the field of energy – as represented by coal, electricity and nuclear power. The Social Democrats will work out a pilot scheme which will be dovetailed with plans for an over-all "energy program" to coordinate the nation's resources (other than oil processing, which will remain in private hands). These plans, the party believes, are necessary in order to insure the survival and continued development of Germany's hard coal resources. Public ownership will not alter the financial structure of the affected industries, which would be "steered" by public boards. Nor are there any plans for extending public ownership to steel and chemicals.

The Social Democrats intend to press for steps to prevent undue concentration of industry. They will actively support "free choice of consumer goods and services, free choice of a place to work, and free competition as an important element of a free economic policy" – gallant slogans indeed for a Socialist Party! They will support the small and middle-sized industries on the grounds that "where the large enterprise predominates, free competition disappears." They will demand a tighter anti-cartel law and enforcement.

One method of preventing undue concentration is by spreading wealth more evenly. The Social Democrats regard the government plan for creating "People's Shares" (the shares of the previously government-owned combine of Preussag, for instance, were sold to people with yearly incomes of under $3,800 in March) as inadequate. Their own proposal is to channel the small investor's money into state-controlled and managed investment trusts, or investment banks.

Next year's completed program will certainly include the provision of more money for social services. The West German social service scheme pays for itself – employers and employed each contribute 50 percent of its funds. The Social Democrats believe that government grants should supplement these funds, in order to benefit the "socially weakest" classes. They want, in addition, better medical attention and better sports facilities for workers. They want better education – with a compulsory 10-year period of "basic" education – and better technical training. They believe that all these things are parts of the "nation's health." Of course, they would have to be paid for, and here the Social Democrats have no more original ideas than those produced by the British Labour Party leaders. The necessary money, the Social Democrats argue, would come out of increased production and cutting defense costs, which does not answer the question as to where the money would come from in a period of heightened international tension and economic recession.

But there is no blinking the fact that the Social Democrats are moving out of the realms of ideology and into those of strictly practical planning. The party leadership's eye is firmly fixed on that comfortable, prosperous and innately cautious middle-class, which asks only for continuing prosperity and ever greater security. If enough members of this class can be won over, the Social Democrats might yet oust Dr. Adenauer's Christian Democrats from power in 1961. A respectable, pale-pink butterfly is emerging from the chrysalis whose original red was rusting.

TERENCE PRITTIE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Sing, for God's Sake"

A rather pathetic note was struck in the papers last week when Mrs. Dwight D. Eisenhower was quoted as remarking to a department store clerk, I think it's too much for him – I don't think he should do it."

She referred to the impending Quest of the Golden Fleece which involves for the President 20,000 miles of travel to 11 countries on three continents. She is right. Of course he shouldn't do it, but needs must when the devil drives. Since the Administration's ordinary processes of diplomacy have not availed to lessen appreciably the existing tensions of the Cold War, President Eisenhower must try anything else that occurs to him and his advisers.

Doubtless what Mrs. Eisenhower had in mind is the physical strain of such an adventure, which is formidable for a man crowding 70 and with Mr. Eisenhower's medical history. But if he were half his age and in the physical form of a champion athlete, still there would be weighty arguments against the embarkation for Colchis. To begin with, the outcome is doubtful and there are perils other than excessive fatigue lurking along the way. A very slight error in tact, or a bit of misinformation about some local situation might easily do more damage to the expedition than any of the fabulous monsters did to Jason and his crew.

More than that, this country has just been put through 116 days of pretty severe trial by the steel strike and no permanent settlement has yet been reached. We are now threatened with a railroad strike and a resumption of the dockers' strike which, together, could paralyze the economy. It is not an auspicious time for even a short vacancy at the summit of national leadership.

There is also the consideration that whatever personal relations Mr. Eisenhower may establish with the heads of foreign states are limited to 13 months' duration at most. Thanks largely to his own party's enthusiasm for the 22nd Amendment, in January, 1961, there will be another President of the United States and Dwight D. Eisenhower's personal relations with the world's rulers will be of no further effect. Any advantages he may obtain by face-to-face talks must be embodied in treaties or other formal agreements very rapidly if they are to be permanent.

Thus the physical strain as an argument against the venture is at least equalled by the domestic situation and by the fact that the Argonaut is an out-going, not an incoming President. They are all serious disadvantages.

On the other hand, this evidence that Mr. Eisenhower has at last laid hold of the helm in forthright fashion is of great importance as a stimulant to American morale. Now that he has realized the urgency of the need of leadership in foreign affairs he may presently be convinced that some measure of guidance is equally desirable in domestic affairs. If the persons with whom he converses abroad are frank, he may return to Washington with a different point of view on many phases of the world situation.

It is just possible, indeed, that he may discover that he, like the TV audience, has been victimized by more than one rigged show. What that discovery would do to him is beyond conjecture, but it is conceivable that it might make a different man of him for what is left of the rest of his term.

Under these circumstances it is not easy to determine what is a reasonable attitude of a superficial observer toward the project. Perhaps Mrs. Eisenhower's reluctant acquiescence is as sensible as any. There is certainly much to be gained by a successful quest; but just as certainly there are perils, many and strange, along the way and not a few left at home. Our Argonaut will need all the luck that attended Jason if he is to bring home the Golden Fleece that will protect us against the blizzards of a Cold War.

We can only "take short views, hope for the best, and trust in God." And steel ourselves as well to endure the worst. At the outset, common politeness dictates that we should give hope priority and offer the President the send-off of a cheerful chorus. Perhaps we might do well to take a leaf out of old Jean de Joinville's book, that one on which he describes the embarkation of St. Louis for the Crusade: "Our master mariner called to his seamen who stood at the prow, and said: 'Are you ready?' and they answered, 'Aye, sir – let the clerks and priests come forward!' As soon as these had come forward, he called to them, 'Sing, for God's sake!' and they all, with one voice, chanted."

Whatever may betide, we are in for it now. There is no backing out at this late date. So, since there is, after all, some chance of glory and gain, we may as well make the best of it and all, with one voice, sing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MADRID, Nov. 14 – *President Eisenhower's decision to visit here as the guest of Generalissimo Francisco Franco is being widely interpreted as evidence of the correctness of the Spanish chief of state's policies over the last 20 years.* – The New York Times, November 15, 1959.

Spain Under Franco

by Ian Gilmour

Generalissimo Franco must be given his due. Having started one civil war, he has prevented anyone else starting another. Not of course that anybody has been likely to do so. The last one was such a dreadful experience that the great majority of Spaniards have up till now been ready to accept anything rather than risk a repetition. Still, if the danger has been slight, General Franco has made it slighter by consistently managing to keep the memory of the war as alive as possible – it is, of course, apart from the force at his command, his most important political asset – and thus avoiding the risk of a national reconciliation. The achievement of internal peace, therefore, must not be denied him.

In essentials Generalissimo Franco's Police State is much like any other Police State. Spaniards have no political or civil rights. There is no freedom of speech – newspapers and radio are rigidly censored. There is no proper freedom of religion. Recently in Madrid a Protestant pastor was put on trial for attempting to enter his own church, and in 1956 the Bibles of the Foreign Bible Society were seized as they were in the time of Borrow. There is no freedom of association: political parties are illegal, and so are political propaganda and strikes – even the Boy Scouts are banned.

I went to the trial in Madrid of Luis Alberto Solana Madariaga, the 23-year-old nephew of Salvador de Madariaga, the well-known Spanish writer and liberal. The trial was before a military court, since Madariaga was accused of plotting armed rebellion against the State. What he had actually done, or was alleged to have done, was to distribute leaflets calling for a 24-hour strike. Before five stolid-looking officers and a large crucifix, the prosecutor, another officer, solemnly argued that Madariaga must be nearly a Communist, since the Communists were heavily involved in the proposed strike, and the defending officer said that this could not be so as Madariaga was a good Roman Catholic. He was sent to prison for three years.

There is torture. People who are taken to police stations accused of illegal political activity are liable to be subjected to its less refined forms, unless they happen to belong to a social stratum high enough to make the police consider such treatment disrespectful. If they are workers they are likely to receive the additional insult of having their "crime" entered as theft. This keeps the number of political prisoners down.

What is less usual about Franco's Police State is that it is European and is supported and heavily subsidized by the European democracies and by the United States, which are alleged to believe in freedom. The regime has no apparent ideal or purpose other than the maintenance of Franco in power. It is true that the Generalissimo still talks about a crusade, but even if there ever was a crusade it has long since become a career – Franco's career. Utterly without principle, he could become a Marxist tomorrow if his interests demanded it, or even a democrat, if he thought anybody would vote for him.

The contest for political power in the country is only an elaborate and rather unsavory charade, in which the Generalissimo arranges the syllables or factions in such a way that they do not make a full word or consistent program. He does this in order to prevent any one faction becoming too powerful and in order to prevent the regime having any other *raison d'être* than himself. And he is able to do it because the politicians do not possess real power. Real power, because of the support he is given by the forces that matter – the army, the Church and the old and the new rich – is exercised by the Caudillo himself. The politicians are merely the various suits of clothes that he chooses to wear from time to time and then discards.

Economically the regime can claim some remarkable achievements. It has carried out some good irrigation and land reclamation projects chiefly in Estremadura, near Badajoz, and in Aragon, and since 1940 more than three million acres of land have been reforested. Above

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all, it has managed a large amount of industrialization, which has greatly reduced the incidence of rural unemployment. The national income for the last few years has been rising by about five percent a year. It has developed the country since the war more than any previous regime has done, though probably less in proportion than other countries have in the same period. Whether any other regime would have done a great deal more is speculation and of doubtful relevance.

What is relevant is that as the regime has industrialized the country it has also made it bankrupt. Despite $1 billion of American aid between 1954 and 1959 Spain exports little more than half of what she imports. The balance-of-payments deficit was $394 million in 1957, $372 million in 1958, and in the first quarter of 1959 imports were $216 million and exports $116 million. What has gone wrong? The fundamental defect of the Spanish economy is that it is entirely uneconomic. The system, such as it is, can most nearly be described as one of monopoly capitalism – if Marx were able to visit Spain today he would think he had been right after all. There is much too little competition. Labor agitation and strikes are illegal – yet a firm cannot fire a worker without special permission. The "trade unions," in which in any case the employers are enrolled as well as the workers, are controlled by the government. And just as the government is responsible to nobody and is immune from any form of criticism, so industry, though subjected to a variety of irritating restrictions and controls, is also responsible to nobody.

Instead of starting small with industrialization and working up, the government started big and worked down. In a predominantly agricultural country it would surely have been elementary prudence to pay at least as much attention to the development of agriculture as to industrialization. In fact agriculture has been neglected, so that it cannot at the moment support a modern industrial structure. Agricultural production has grown very slowly. Allowing for the increase in population, food output per head in 1956 was still about 10 percent below the pre-Civil War level. The chief object of the industrialization was to make Spain self-sufficient. Yet she still has to import food as well as raw materials, and her exports of agricultural produce are well below what they were before the war. She often has to use as much foreign exchange to import raw materials, with which she makes goods that are made cheaper and better elsewhere, as she would have had to import the goods themselves. The tendency of the industrialization to increase imports without increasing exports has been encouraged by a complicated system of multiple exchange rates.

Ian Gilmour *is editor of* The Spectator *of London. This article is adapted from his report on Spain which appears in that magazine's November 13 issue.*

The natural megalomania of all dictatorships has played its part. Industries have been set up not according to economic but for prestige considerations. The big, spectacular and uneconomic is always preferred to the small, useful and profitable. Thus it was discovered a few years ago that the Spanish merchant marine was out of date and needed a face-lift. Promptly a very heavy investment in shipbuilding yards was set in motion with the result that Spain now has the capacity to produce about 350,000 tons of shipping annually, which of course she does not need. The same thing is happening in iron and steel as a result of the building of the steel works at Aviles. Spain will produce 25 percent more steel than she can consume, so that a great deal must be exported, and it must be exported at a loss, since Spanish industrial costs are much greater than those of other countries.

Forty-eight percent of all Spanish investment goes in building, and this does not include public building, which accounts for another 13 percent. The trouble is that the people who make money invest it, like Saudi Arabian princes, in buildings rather than in industry, both to avoid taxes and because they have, reasonably, no great faith in Spanish industry. Also if they invest in buildings, they can get a subsidy for workers' housing, although there is no question of any workers living there. Diplomats and rich businessmen can be found living in flats that have been built with a government subsidy. The workers' housing situation is still deplorable.

A Banker's Paradise

This misdirection of investment makes the inflation very much worse. Expansion has been financed by a 15 percent inflation each year. Industrial losses have been financed by credit which has then been paid back by inflation. In 1955 the cost of living was nine times what it was in 1922-26, in 1956 10 times, in 1957 11 times, and in 1958 about 13 times. Spain is a banker's paradise. The five big banks control 70 percent of the economy, and they will soon control more. Many of those who cannot get credit will go bankrupt – in the second quarter of 1958 there were five commercial bankruptcies in Barcelona; in the same period in 1959 there were 33 – and the banks will step in and take the pickings. They get a fantastic return on their capital. In 1957 the Banco Central on a capital of 375 million pesetas made a profit of 244 million.

With manufactured imports strictly excluded and the importation of raw materials controlled by a license system, success in industry has depended not upon efficiency or ability to sell goods cheaply but on graft and the ability to get an import license by bribing the right general or civilian crony of the regime. A vast network of licenses and controls has been set up which works according to no economic principle but by bribery and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

influences. Many of the *Cajas Autónomas*, as they are called, and there are more than 800 of them, are merely parasites on the economy. And those that are not parasitic are usually corrupt and inefficient. These bodies have been a very important source of political strength to Franco. They are staffed by his supporters, who find the money they get from bribes and from the "fines" imposed a most acceptable form of income.

It is not, of course, only in import licenses that this system rules. It also works in the setting-up of factories. If you decide that you would like to make oxygen, say, your object is not to make it cheaper or better than anybody else can make it; your object is to stop anybody else making it at all. This is done naturally by bribing the appropriate bureaucracies. The setting-up of monopolies and quasi-monopolies and the creation of artificial shortages to drive up prices and make money for those in the regime is another important source of the Caudillo's political power.

All the economy is theoretically controlled, including prices. Price control often does not have much effect upon the price at which goods reach the public, but it has considerable effect on the price received for his goods by the producer. Thus, through fixing the price of olives too low, the government drove many people out of the olive business, with the result that Spain, almost the biggest olive-producer in the world, is now a net importer of vegetable oils.

The Economic Racket

Smuggling is a flourishing industry. It is commonly believed that almost every day trucks heavily loaded with smuggled goods can be seen coming away from the frontier with generals in the front seat to see that they are not stopped. Whether or not that is true, the value of goods smuggled into Spain each year is about $196 million – nearly a quarter of the total Spanish imports.

Although the export of capital is illegal, it is inevitably general. Last year, at a time when the government's foreign exchange reserve was under $84 million, it was discovered as a result of the arrest and interrogation of two Swiss bank officials that people who had done well out of the regime had many times that sum deposited in Swiss banks. The exact figure is not known, but it is not thought to have been much less than $420 million. The names of many of the offenders were published and many of them were fined. Others, who were not named or fined, are generally believed to have been the largest offenders and to have included people close to the Caudillo. There is, of course, no reason to believe that Switzerland is the only country which the beneficiaries of the regime have favored with their investments. In this way are the benefits of American aid dispersed throughout the world.

The position of those excluded from the economic racket, the professional and working classes, is less enviable. Architects, stockbrokers, and notaries public are prosperous. The first average nearly $8,400 a year, and the other two about $4,200. Doctors average nearly $2,800 and lawyers about $1,960. Thirty-six thousand teachers average about $420, a figure which is made scarcely more credible by the fact that priests get considerably less. To exist, the less well-off of the middle classes have to do two jobs; university professors work in banks or act as business accountants. This is even more necessary for the workers. A worker with children, whose wife does not work and who only works an eight-hour day or a 46-hour week, does not have enough to eat. A worker who works for the same amount of time as he worked before the Civil War in 1936 is much worse off than he was then. On the other hand, families in which there is more than one worker and where the man works 70 hours a week are rather better off than they were in 1936 when there was only one worker in the family and he only worked a 48-hour week. More than 95 percent earn less than $840 a year.

Today a 70-hour week in Spain is not uncommon, and there are many who work even longer hours. Having to do two jobs necessarily means that both are done badly. Tourists find Spain extremely cheap, but this is only because of the low wages. Food is not cheap; it costs about the same as it does in England. Last year Spanish oranges grown less than 200 miles away in Valencia were more expensive in Barcelona than in England. This year they cost about the same. When foreign meat and eggs have to be imported by the government, despite a much higher wage level in their country of origin, they undercut Spanish produce by about 30 percent. In the two years up to the beginning of 1959 food prices rose by 40 percent. A worker in Spain has to work four times as long as one in England and more than twice as long as one in France or Italy to buy the equivalent amount of food.

It is true that the regime has instituted a number of social service benefits which never existed before, but since these have been largely eaten up by the inflation and since a high proportion of them get lost by the wayside – it is estimated that of the four percent paid by employers to the health service only about ½ percent reaches it – a slightly more tolerable wage would be preferred. Workers also have considerable security of employment, but this again would be more highly valued if the employment brought in a living wage. One need hardly add that skilled workers emigrate from Spain in the thousands. . . . In order to preserve Franco the Americans spend large sums of money attempting to bring economic progress to Spain, but because Franco is preserved, skilled workers leave Spain in droves and prevent much real economic progress being made.

Spain, it is often said, is a country occupied by its own army. The principal function of the army is indeed not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to protect the country from any outside danger, but to protect the regime from being overthrown by its own subjects. It is the Caudillo's praetorian guard; without its support he would not last five minutes. But the picture of an army devoted to the Generalissimo and living on the country in great luxury is false, or rather it is true only of the generals. They, certainly, have never had it so good. Given sinecure jobs and allowed to take an active part in all the various economic swindles, they have every reason to be satisfied with life and to be grateful to a chief who has let them loose on the spoils of so many offices. Throughout his life the Caudillo's rivals have had a useful habit of leaving this world at convenient moments, and today none of the surviving generals, at least individually, looks like a potential Kassem. Military power is dispersed among the eight regional Captains-General, and there is no effective general staff. The organization of the army thus both reflects its role – to deal with internal not external opposition – and makes a concerted military revolt very difficult.

The rest of the army, however, has no reason to feel affection or gratitude to Franco. The officers from colonel down are badly paid and, unlike the generals, are not given the opportunity to cash in on the economic system. Instead they are its victims. Many of them, like most of the rest of the middle classes, have to take an outside job. There are thus officers who at night become taxi drivers or cinema attendants, and engage in other activities not normally associated with the profession of arms. This necessity has accelerated the decline in the social status of the army. Being an army officer no longer brings a good social position, and soldiering is now a bourgeois, not an aristocratic, profession. This means that the time may soon come when the army will not be the willing instrument of the extreme Right and will revert to its 19th-Century position, when it was still a confounded nuisance – there were 31 military pronunciamentos in 120 years – but its political allegiance was less predictable.

At present democracy is generally regarded even by the young officers as the guise of anti-Christ, and the rule of the country by the army is considered normal and right. But those officers who have been to America and seen the negligible part the vastly more powerful American army plays in governing the US must have had their prejudices severely shaken, and in time this can hardly fail to affect the outlook of the other officers. The army, then, like the rest of Spain has been thoroughly demoralized by Franco, demoralized by the corruption at the top and the poverty below – conscripts are paid half a peseta a day – and by the knowledge that its only likely deployment is against its own countrymen. Its attitude can be described as a compound of suspicion, ignorance and resentment of the modern world, and while the lower army officers will not make any attempt to remove the Generalissimo by themselves, they would, if given a lead from the top, not be sorry to see him go.

The position of the Church is in many ways similar. The bishops, like the generals, are sitting pretty. Not materially; the Spanish Church is not rich in the sense that its members are highly paid, though the extensive clerical building program suggests considerable capital resources, some of which may come from outside Spain. The satisfaction of the bishops stems from their political power and from the realization that in almost every activity the influence of the Church is prominent.

Spanish bishops have been brought up to believe that the separation of Church and State is heretical; and any who have come to doubt the truth of this dogma have had their doubts stilled by remembering that they were appointed by General Franco: under the Concordat the Caudillo in effect appoints the bishops. (There is, of course, nothing new in this; the custom goes back to Ferdinand and Isabella.) Further, they well remember the Civil War and are grateful to Franco for his protection then.

Enlightenment in the Hierarchy

The hierarchy consider the present form of government in Spain to be that which, in a well-ordered world, all Christendom would have. Some of them are socially progressive. The Bishops of Zaragoza and Málaga and the ex-Bishops of Cordoba are the most prominent examples. The Bishop of Zaragoza has issued some fiery pastoral letters; last year one of them said: "In 20 years no one has done anything to cure the social problems of Spain, and in consequence the workers are condemned to permanent discontent." The Bishop of Málaga has greatly helped the poor in his diocese and has been prominent in Catholic working-class activities, while the ex-Bishop of Cordoba managed to do much for workers' housing. But the political views of the average Spanish bishop are about as enlightened as those of Pio Nono and the Syllabus of Errors. To them democracy, anarchy, socialism and Communism are roughly synonymous, and equally anathema. One prelate told me that he was against democracy because he was against swings of the pendulum. Evidently he did not regard civil wars and military revolutions as swings of the pendulum.

The younger priests have no such illusions. Many of them would not disagree with a word written here. They know that when the Church becomes closely involved with the State it necessarily gets blamed for the latter's shortcomings, and that people who oppose Franco, therefore, tend to oppose the Church as well. They ascribe the Church's misfortune over the last 150 years to two causes: to its having been closely bound up with the State and to its nearly always having sided with the rich against the poor. They would like to see the Concordat torn up and the Pope, not the Spanish Government, ap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

point the bishops. They would like the relationship between Church and State to be such that the Church can freely criticize the government; and they would like to see the end of the Church's control of education.

In short, they want a Church Spiritual and not a Church Temporal. Only then, they believe, will there be a prospect of a genuine religious revival in Spain. Living so much closer to the people they are in a better position than the bishops to see how far the de-Christianization of Spain has gone and to assess the true position of the Church – a difficult thing to do since in many places people go to mass not for religious reasons but in order to keep in with the Church and the regime. Militant atheism in the middle classes seems to have given way to a somewhat tired toleration. On the other hand, anti-clericalism amongst the workers has been growing in the last few years. One survey by Catholic Action of a workers' suburb showed 89 percent of those questioned admitting to being definitely anti-clerical and seven percent going to church regularly.

The Opposition

Granted that the Franco regime is detestable, what are the chances of getting rid of it and what will succeed it? These questions are closely related since upon how and when the regime comes to an end depends the form and the chances of success of its successor. Provided that the army remains loyal, the modern Police State cannot be overthrown by a mass rising of the people. Modern weapons have ruled out that solution. There remains, apart from assassination, only economic collapse. Left to itself the Franco regime would have ended through bankruptcy in the early fifties and again in the last few months. On the first occasion it was saved by America alone and on the second by America and the OEEC countries. The sole means of removing the dictator and his odious apparatus and associates have thus been blocked by the democracies. And this has been done, by the Americans at least, in the name of freedom.

It is difficult to know how valuable militarily are the five major American bases in Spain. But they were not fully operational much, if at all, before the beginning of 1958, and guided missiles will have made them obsolete by 1963. Whether their military usefulness outweighs the damage to the American reputation elsewhere in the world and the revelation of American hypocrisy about freedom and democracy is at least doubtful. The difficulties in which this *mesalliance* involves the US were demonstrated during President Eisenhower's recent visit to London. In his television talk with Mr. Macmillan the President said that "freedom was an imperative" for the West; the next day he received the Foreign Minister of his ally Franco.

Whatever the effects of American policy elsewhere, they have been dismal in Spain. Anti-Americanism is as general and as strong as anti-Francoism. Some of this is due to the inevitable incidents between American servicemen and the local population, but most of it is due to the knowledge that as much as the Spanish army the United States Government is responsible for the present existence of the Franco regime. It would be hard to think of a better reason for unpopularity.

In the sense that they dislike and despise the regime, practically everybody in Spain is a member of the opposition, but this is only a critical opposition. The *political* opposition is much smaller. Enough has already been said to show that for the Communists the present situation is almost perfect. Indeed, the list of people who were doing well out of the regime should really have included the Communists. The economic system is designed to help them; its corruption, unfairness and inefficiency discredit capitalism, while the violence with which it is supported does nothing to discourage a belief in violent remedies. At present even Marx's theory of increasing wealth and increasing misery applies. The rich are getting much richer, and the decline in overtime and in secondary jobs – leaving aside those who are totally unemployed – means that the standard of living of the poor will fall far below what it was in the thirties. Even when, owing to the increase in the national income and to the extraordinary hours they worked, the standard of living of the poor was rising, the incomes of the rich were rising faster and the distribution of money was growing more not less unequal.

The suppression of freedom and of democratic parties gives an immense advantage to the Communists. Their leaders are dedicated men prepared to work 24 hours a day for the cause. They excel in underground activity and organization. Franco's habit of identifying almost all opposition as Communist gives them great prestige and popularity. Their closed and rigid system of ideas does not need open discussion for its propagation as do democratic ideas. In the uneasy atmosphere of Spain the certainties of Marxism give it an attraction that it would not otherwise possess; there has been a tremendous upsurge of Marxism in the universities, though of course a great many Marxists are not Communists. (The *Frente Liberación Popular*, which is powerful in the universities, is a Marxist body which contains many Catholics.) America has discredited democratic ideals and discouraged the democrats, and her liaison with Franco is breeding Communists like rabbits. The Russians are almost as helpful. They supply money and above all radio stations. Radio Paris is listened to a little, the BBC rather less, and the Voice of America not at all. Spaniards do not want to hear about the achievements of America – they can *see* them – or about the achievements of Britain and France. They want to hear about Spanish affairs and they want to hear abuse of the Caudillo. Naturally, therefore, they listen to one of the nine or ten Communist stations broadcasting in Spanish and in par-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ticular to *Radio España Independiente* sent out from Prague. It is almost impossible to exaggerate the advantage conferred upon the Communists by the possession of their own radio stations or the handicap conferred upon the Spanish democrats by the lack of one.

The Communists need the Caudillo as much as he needs them. Each is the other's open weapon. Under no other regime could the Communists flourish as they do now, whereas without their existence it is hard to believe that even the most virulent base-mania would induce the US Government to go on using the American taxpayers' money in order to preserve the Generalissimo. Franco says to the Americans that either they must give him money or there will be a Communist Spain, and the Americans promptly pay up. What they fail to realize is that it is not Franco *or* the Communists that they are buying, it is Franco *and* the Communists. The two go together in a package deal.

The only debit item the Communists now have is their past; their brutality and ruthlessness to their own side during the Civil War have not been forgotten. It is impossible to gauge their exact strength now. The 24-hour protest strike last July which was sponsored by them was a fiasco. But it would be unwise to infer from this that they are weak. Like everybody else they were affected by Spain's prostration after the Civil War and the appalling poverty of the forties. Serious political opposition, Communist and non-Communist, began only a few years ago. Since then the Communists have been growing fast, they are already strong, and so long as Franco lasts their strength will rapidly increase.

Democratic Opposition

The democratic opposition is of its very nature much less monolithic than the Communists, but it has at last formed a united front and constituted a Central Committee. This is composed of the following groups, all illegal: the Christian Democrats, the *Unión Española*, the *Acción Democrática*, the UGT (the Socialist Trade Union), the CNT (the Anarchist Trade Union), and the *Agrupación Socialista Universitaria*.

The Christian Democrats are led by Gil Robles and Jimenez Fernandez. Gil Robles was the right wing's leader under the republic, and Jimenez Fernandez was for a time Minister of Agriculture in the right-wing republican government. The Christian Democrats are a Catholic group, who believe that the Church should keep out of politics for its own good. Their views, indeed, on the Church and politics are similar to those of the younger priests outlined earlier. They aim to be a party like the Christian Democrats in Germany and Italy and the MRP in France, and repudiate any intention of being confessional in the historic sense of the word. In a democratic Spain the Christian Democrats would be on the right center. Gil Robles himself has moved considerably to the left since the thirties.

The *Unión Española* is chiefly composed of enlightened businessmen and is led by Joaquin Satrustegui, a Basque businessman, and Tierno Galvan, a professor at Salamanca University. At a meeting at Madrid earlier this year Satrustegui and Tierno publicly criticized the regime and were heavily fined. Tierno has been to prison for his views. The *Unión Española* is fervently monarchist and its most firmly held tenet is that the monarchist solution is the only one for Spain. In a democratic Spain many of its members would join the Christian Democrats; others would form a conservative party to the right of that group.

Dionisio Ridruejo is the leader of the *Acción Democrática*. A former Falangist, Ridruejo has been arrested twice for expressing what may roughly be described as liberal or right-wing-labor views. The *Acción Democrática* is a liberal, social democratic body and can expect to gain most of its followers from the four million or so people in Spain who are employed in services, administration, etc. It will be in the center to the left of the Christian Democrats and to the right of the Socialists.

The ASU was formed after the Madrid University demonstrations in 1956 and is composed of young men of left-wing Socialist opinions. The police are inclined to be particularly nasty to the Socialists they arrest, so only Vicente Girbau and Juan Kindelan, who are both safely abroad, can be named. For the same reason the leaders of the UGT and CNT in Spain must remain anonymous; though two Socialist leaders, Antonio Amat Maiz and Luis Martin Santos, the first a lawyer and the second a doctor, can be mentioned since they are both already in prison.

In Barcelona there are similar groups: the *Unión Democrática de Catalunya*, who are Christian Democrats, the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, which used to be the majority party in Catalonia and is left-wing but non-Marxist, the *Moviment Socialista de Catalunya*, the Catalan equivalent of the ASU, and the *Nacionalistas*, the Catalan Nationalist Party. Here again, because of Franco's fear and hatred of Catalonia and Catalans it is better not to mention names.

All these, together with the important PSOE, the main Socialist Party with headquarters in Toulouse, form the united democratic opposition to the Generalissimo. What are they united on? They are united first on the need to get rid of Franco and to end his debauchery of Spain with all possible speed. Whereas *émigrés* will argue late into the night about the exact legal form which should follow the exit of the Caudillo and the precise terms upon which they are prepared to cooperate with other groups, the opposition of the interior, who have to live under him, are impatient of such niceties. They realize that the poison must be expelled before arguments begin as to how the cure should be celebrated. Secondly, they believe that Franco's regime should be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

succeeded by a democratic and constitutional monarchy.

The Spanish King or Pretender is Don Juan, the son of Alfonso XIII, who abdicated in 1931, though if Franco ever did reconstitute the Spanish monarchy (theoretically Spain is a regency with the Caudillo, as was Admiral Horthy in Hungary, a regent for an unnamed monarch) he would probably attempt to choose as its first incumbent Don Juan's young son, Don Juan Carlos, who, because of his youth, would be more likely to evince that pliability which the Caudillo so admires in his subordinates. There are three ways in which the monarchy could be brought back. It could be brought back by Franco, in which case it would inherit all his unpopularity and would not last long. It could be brought back against the opposition of Franco and the supporters of the regime, which would mean another civil war. Or it could be brought back by outflanking Franco, which is the only feasible way. Outflanking Franco means that it would be brought back by the supporters of the present regime, in particular the army.

If the generals and the Right were prudent and logical they would make the change from Franco to Don Juan as soon as possible. The new generation does not remember the Civil War and is not obsessed by the fear of another one. It despises its elders for their behavior during the war, and it despises the democracies for propping up Franco. It is impatient, above all, of political or ideological alignments that are still based upon the Civil War. The fathers of many of them were killed by the Republicans, but they are not bitter and they feel as strongly about Franco as does the most implacable republican exile. Their dominant desire is for a genuine national reconciliation, which, they know, can only be achieved by the Generalissimo's departure.

This new generation, Franco's age, and the growth of the Communists are enough to make the Right fear the future, and they are all factors which, from their point of view, will get worse not better. Unless a peaceful transition to a stable regime is carried out fairly soon, they are in for a nasty time. The only possible foundation for such a regime is the monarchy, and the sooner the monarchy returns the stronger it will be. And if it is to be strong and enjoy general acceptance, it is very important that it should return as the result of the removal of Franco, not of his death. It must come in as an alternative to the Caudillo not as his successor, as his opponent not his heir. But unless he is going to be like King Victor Emmanuel with Mussolini, it can only last if it gains the confidence and allegiance of the opposition. That is the monarchical problem. It can only be set up by the Right, it can only survive through the Left. Don Juan, a charming and intelligent man, is aware of the difficulties. His own temperament, my impression was, is liberal, and he fully realizes that the only kind of monarchy that can survive in Spain is the democratic constitutional brand of Britain and Scandinavia. Indeed, after the war he made a declaration to that effect. But the more he professes his belief in constitutions, human rights and democracy, the more he frightens the army and the less disposed they are to send for him. On the other hand, if he keeps silent the Left becomes suspicious and begins to think that he is a stooge of the Caudillo's.

Regional Rivalries

Franco's propaganda has led many people, some of whom should know better, to believe that only an authoritarian regime can work in Spain and that any other will lead to another civil war. The causes of the last Civil War were:

1. The world economic depressions.
2. The rise of Fascism in Europe and its struggle with Communism.
3. The refusal of the Spanish Right to accept the reforms introduced by the first government of the Republic, reforms which were, except for the laws relating to the Church, extremely moderate.
4. The refusal of the Socialists to join the government after the victory of the Left in the elections of 1936.

One cannot be sure that the post-Franco regime will not have to face a world economic depression, but there is no sign of one at present. A repetition of the struggle between Fascism and Communism in Europe is highly unlikely. The Spanish extreme Right is tainted with its collaboration with Francoism and will be much less powerful than it was in the thirties. The Socialists now realize that Prieto was right in wanting to join the 1936 government and that Largo Caballero was disastrously wrong in refusing to do so. They will not make the same sort of mistake again.

There is no prospect, then, of the 1936 situation recurring, but the post-Franco regime will nevertheless be faced with fearful problems, the almost perennial problems of Spain – the poverty of the country, the regional question, interference by the army in politics, the relationship of Church and State and the distribution of income between rich and poor. Except for the first, Franco has done nothing to solve them and indeed has made them more acute.

The regional question chiefly concerns Catalonia and the Basques. The rivalry between Castile (roughly Madrid) and Catalonia (roughly Barcelona) is ancient and has usually taken the form of the oppression of Catalonia by Castile. The same thing has happened to the Basques. There is a Catalan and a Basque language, neither of which is tolerated or recognized by the regime. After the war the Caudillo directed that only "imperial Spanish" should be officially recognized in Spain, and Catalan and Basque are relegated to the status of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign and un-Christian languages, though it is, of course, rare for the Basques and the Catalans to speak anything else. The center of Catalan nationalism is the Benedictine Monastery of Montserrat, and Catalan and Basque nationalism is supported and led by the Church except for the bishops. Some of the bishops in Catalonia do not even speak Catalan and wholeheartedly support the Caudillo's anti-Catalan policy. The Basque provinces are much more Catholic than any other part of Spain, and both there and in Catalonia the Church's connection with the national movements brings to itself as much support as it does to the movements. Catalonia and the Basque country have been called the Irelands of Spain, but they are really Irelands in reverse. The Basques and the Catalans are the most industrious, advanced, efficient and prosperous people in Spain. Their subjection to Madrid is as though London had been governed by Dublin.

Because of the regional question, the Basques, though fiercely conservative, fought with the radical Catalans on the Republican side. Besides the traditional military devotion to centralism, the Generalissimo thus has a further reason for repressing the Catalans and the Basques, for ignoring their traditional rights and liberties and for attempting to stamp out their national feelings. His policy has had the predictable result of strengthening and inflaming these feelings.

The Castilian revulsion against separatism is so deep-seated that in Madrid even the opposition groups, save for Ridruejo's, are inclined to underestimate the strength and justification of Basque and Catalan feelings. Complete independence is plainly impracticable both politically and economically. Federalism would almost certainly be the best solution; regional pride would be assuaged and the unity of the country preserved. But local autonomy, on the Sicilian model, which is the minimum demand of the Basques and Catalans, will be the probable answer. There is some danger that on the Generalissmo's departure the Basques (but not the Catalans) will attempt to negotiate from a position of semi-independence.

The action that the new government might have to take against the Basques would further strengthen the position of the army within it. If Spain is going to become increasingly associated with the rest of Europe, her army will have to learn to behave like a European and not an Arab or South American organization, though the French army has rather blurred the distinction. But this process will take time. Initially the army leaders will be reluctant to leave politics to politicians, and they will need firm and tactful handling by Don Juan if they are to be kept in their proper place. Considerable restraint by the politicians will also be necessary. Provocation of the generals must be avoided if they are to be sent into retirement gracefully. The transition to democracy must be gradual. The parties must be given time to organize and the party leaders to make themselves more widely known. Human and civil rights must come first; full political rights later. There must be a period of convalescence. Prudence, as well as the army, should dictate gradualness.

The Church will be easier. The hierarchy are too discredited to be troublesome, and the strength of the Christian opposition to Franco will ensure that there is no attack on the Church. The younger priests and the Christian politicians and the non-Christians all agree that the Concordat must be torn up and the Church taken out of politics. Don Juan's relations with the Vatican are good and there is no reason to doubt that the change, which is to everybody's advantage, will be carried through smoothly.

The Spanish economy is at the stage where it could, if sensibly directed, grow very fast. An end to the present appalling exploitation of the workers would ensure that the benefits of this growth went to them. There is a good social case to be made for breaking up the large estates in the south, but tax measures to make the landowners cultivate their land properly are more urgent and more likely. The land problem in Spain is not so much that of big land-owners but of small, and improved credit facilities, and the encouragement of cooperatives would do much to make the many small holdings viable. The poverty of the poor both in industry and on the land could thus be significantly mitigated without an attack on the rich.

Fruits of Corruption

Twenty years of a cruel and corrupt dictatorship are not the best preparation for decency and democracy. The Caudillo has corrupted the whole country. Spain, like Mr. Waugh's Neutralia, supports "a vast ill-paid bureaucracy whose work is tempered and humanized by corruption." Franco rules through fear and football; the fear is of being shot down or imprisoned, of another civil war, of the Communists, of the have-nots; football is the new opiate of the masses. And the 20-year dissipation of Francoism will leave Spain with a terrible hangover. Yet the new regime will inherit a vast fund of goodwill simply by not being Francoist and by genuinely bringing national reconciliation. The problems it will face are not insuperable. An early return of the monarchy will not produce another war; it is the clinging to power of the Caudillo which is likely to do that. If Franco remains for another 8 or 10 years, his probable successors will be civil war and Communism.

From 1940 to 1942 the Caudillo openly and loudly proclaimed his desire for a German victory; he then veered into neutrality, which, as an Allied victory became more certain, gradually evolved into benevolent neutrality, until he had the impudence to write to Mr. Churchill suggesting an alliance. This July Franco did

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a similar somersault. Spain was bankrupt: without foreign money the regime would collapse, and the only possible sources of cash were America and the OEEC countries. The latter could not allow him to join them in OEEC and could not give him money without some liberalization of the Spanish economy, and even the Americans had begun to think that Spain was a rather expensive dependent. There was nothing else for it. Twenty years of autarchy were abandoned and the Caudillo embraced economic liberalism. For this death-bed conversion he got 418 million vitally-needed dollars – 75 million from the International Monetary Fund, 100 million from OEEC, 130 million from the US Government, 68 million from private US banks, and 45 million from the consolidation of outstanding debts. But there was no recantation, no admission of past errors. The official doctrine is that up to July 20 autarchy was the perfect policy, and that from July 21 liberalism was an even more perfect policy. Speaking of the economic policy of the last 20 years, Franco's decree says "undoubtedly the restrictive measures were of a temporary nature." Undoubtedly.

According to the Minister of Finance the object of the stabilization plan is the "maintenance of prices inside the country and the maintenance of the peseta abroad." This will be achieved by "liberalization which consists of the suppression of all administrative obstacles which impede the normal level of prices." By the plan the regime has promised the liberalization of 50 percent of her imports, abolition of many of the *Cajas Autónomas*, stabilization of expenditure in the public sector, the abolition of multiple exchange rates, a less obscurantist law on foreign investment in Spain and an intensified credit squeeze. This has meant and will mean a reduction in working hours, considerable unemployment and many commercial bankruptcies.

Whether the stabilization plan will work and manage to introduce some sanity into the Spanish economy depends upon whether it is seriously tried. The Minister of Commerce has compared it to "a rocket travelling without deviation to its objective." But in Franco Spain nothing travels to its objective without deviation. The political system, a competition between conflicting groups without popular support for the favor of the Caudillo, makes it very difficult to carry out a consistent policy. Already at least two big firms have, through influence in high places, gained large credits, which is just the sort of thing the stabilization plan was meant to end. De Gaulle in France and Frondizi in Argentina were able to gain popular support for their stabilization by legitimately blaming their predecessors and by imposing general sacrifices. But in Spain the Caudillo cannot blame himself, and the sacrifices will not be general. Many industrialists are being badly hit and think that they have been betrayed by the regime, but the brunt is being borne by the poor, and there is no popular support for the plan. If, therefore, as is generally expected, there is a large increase in unemployment by the beginning of next year, the temptation for the government to relax and to reinflate will be strong.

Basically, there can be no doubt, the Caudillo prefers inflation. It looks big and successful and its fantasy appeals to him. He only gave it up because he was broke. He will not publicly abandon the stabilization plan; probably he will just dodge and weave. He will try to get more money from the OEEC and America on the grounds that he is gallantly carrying out the stabilization plan, while moderating his unpopularity at home by not carrying it out properly.

What the West Should Do

It might be unfair to refer to the Franco regime's past were it not for its present. M. Pinay has said that we have been reconciled with Germany and Italy, so why not Spain? The answer to that is: where are Hitler and Mussolini? In its membership in the OEEC and in its alliance with America, the Franco regime is a prostitute pretending to be a nun. The democracies may think it unkind to drag up its past, but they surely ought to point out that certain things are not done in nunneries. If Franco does not carry out the stabilization plan properly, OEEC should withhold the remaining $25 million promised.

Public anti-Franco declarations would be worthless, But heavy pressure should be exerted on the regime against its continued and blatant denial of human rights. Francoists have no justification for resenting such "interference." So long as they pretend to be a civilized part of the West they cannot object to a little elementary instruction on the requirements of membership.

Above all, no more money should be poured into the Caudillo's lap. If it is no part of a democracy's duty to attempt to get rid of tyranny, the very least it should do is to avoid subsidizing and maintaining tyranny. The Franco regime is preserved and supported by money from the democracies. Without that support it would collapse. To prate about the superiority and privileges of freedom, toleration and democracy at home while ensuring that those privileges are denied to Spaniards is indecent. And it is made more so by the fact that such behavior, because of the harm it does to the democrats and the help it gives to the Communists, may lead to the near-permanent death of freedom in Spain. Each time the democracies give Franco money, not only do they postpone the day when the army will remove Franco and send for Don Juan, they make such an outcome less likely. The Spanish democratic opposition is now united; it may not always be so. If America and free Europe throw away the next opportunity of allowing the collapse of the regime and a peaceful transition to a democratic successor, they may never get another one.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Different Indias They See

by Selig S. Harrison

"The tingling atmosphere of plans and expectation and uncertainty" which Albert Mayer found in India ten years ago is now almost spent and the opportunity for a decisive American role in the Indian drama almost exhausted. And yet the sympathetic American interest which has grown up in these ten years has a way of feeding on itself, growing in direct proportion, or so it often seems, to the decline of India's own self-confidence and political elan.

India and America
by Phillips Talbot & S. L. Poplai
(Harper; $3.75)

Communism in India
by Marshall Windmiller &
Gene Overstreet
(University of California; $10)

Nehru: A Political Biography
by Michael Brecher
(Oxford; $8.50)

Pilot Project, India
by Albert Mayer, in collaboration
with McKim Marriott & Richard L. Park
(University of California; $5.50)

India Changes!
by Taya Zinkin
(Oxford; $5)

The Leaf and the Flame
by Margaret Parton
(Knopf; $3.95)

The first gesture of sympathy – and curiosity – is the search for some one "book about India." It does not exist. There are instead books about Indo-American relations, Indian Communists, Nehru; books unburdening the response of this or that journalist to six weeks or six years in India. Thus one can say that the book to read for a solid background on Indian attitudes in world affairs is the acute presentation by Phillips Talbot and his Indian collaborator, S. L. Poplai. The mere fact of collaboration by an American and an Indian is enough to make *India and America* a substantial achievement. Joint authorship meant that bold judgments had to be avoided; but it also implied, by its nature, an unusually disciplined attempt to define assumptions and motivations, and, in so doing, to offer a picture which does not seem so mysterious or unmanageable. It is lucid, and precisely because it is so excruciatingly non-committal it should survive new developments. On India's relations with China, for example, the book observed at a time when there was no hint of trouble on the Himalayan border that while Indians took pride in Mr. Nehru's "diplomatic influence in Peking . . . in the American view the effective value of that influence has not yet been put to a severe test."

For a book about Indian Communism the choice is obviously the Windmiller-Overstreet study, *Communism in India*, a 551-page volume carrying the scholarly imprimatur of the Modern India Project at the University of California. Mr. Windmiller's prodigious detective work on the history of the Indian Party and the analysis of Soviet writings on India by Mr. Overstreet, a Russian-language specialist, lift this work far above comparable earlier efforts.

Michael Brecher's *Nehru* is similarly a scholarly journey over much-traveled territory which can be warmly recommended if the reader's interest is modern Indian political history. The distinction of the book lies in a wealth of detail about the Nehru era in Indian politics. Professor Brecher is perceptive and did a reporter's legwork. He had access to some of the early correspondence of Mr. Nehru prior to its release last year by the Prime Minister in *A Bunch of Old Letters*. In one of several interesting conversations with Dr. Brecher, Mr. Nehru made the revealing comment that he had relented on the creation of Pakistan in part out of the fear that the price for incorporating the whole of the indigestibly large Moslem minority would inevitably be a flabby Indian state. "Even if we got freedom for India," he said, "with that background, it would be a very weak India . . . a federal India with far too much power in the federating units. A larger India would have constant troubles, constant disintegrating pulls."

One rather offbeat book which bears on all of the underdeveloped countries is Albert Mayer's documentary record of the pilot "community development" project in 263 villages centering in the Etawah district of north India. Mr. Mayer is the distinguished American town planner and architect who designed Manhattan House, Greenbelt, the new cities of Kitimat in British Columbia and Ashdod in Israel. As an Army Engineer officer stationed in India in 1945 he found a friend in Jawaharlal Nehru, then just freed from his last term in British prisons. They talked of how India could dig its way out of poverty and sloth. "In the context of India's coming inevitable freedom," Mayer recalls, "an American habit asserted itself. I gave my own impressions and offered some suggestions as to 'what I would do'." He urged pilot projects, experimentation, "the desperate importance of making some specific things work rather well as radiating demonstrations." Once prime minister, Nehru invited Mayer to work out his ideas as a government adviser and Mayer assembled (and inspired) the Indian talent for the Etawah project, which was to be the nationwide model for the "community development" program scheduled to touch all of India's 600,000-odd villages by 1961.

Mayer and his editorial collaborators, the political scientist Richard L. Park and the anthropologist McKim Marriott, have selected excerpts from 84 reports, letters and other intra-project memoranda which provide a deeply interesting intellectual play-by-play of the evolving Etawah effort. For the sake of the record some space is given to technical problems – how to increase crop

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

yields or construct brick kilns. But, in the main, the book is another kind of how-to-do-it-story of how men set in old ways can be moved to seek change. India, Mayer found, is hyper-organized at the bureaucratic level and the role of the bureaucrat is to command from afar. Government has its personification at the village level in the British-trained magistrate, "a combination of tax collector and keeper of law and order . . . supreme in authority." Against this tradition Mayer had to create "the democratic staff meeting, the give-and-take, the joint decisions" of his new village extension workers' organization. As for the Gandhian village workers, they were so intent on identifying with people's hardships that they over-identified; they seemed to take privation as a settled fact. "I felt that their approach assumed the existence of more saintly people than the world contains. I feared there would not be enough of them to go around."

What Mayer found above all at Etawah was that six years of sustained effort are necessary before "the people themselves take hold of the work," and he is frank to say that anything less probably leads to shabby results. Yet "higher political considerations" have led to a speed-up, an attempt to duplicate the Etawah experience in thousands of new Etawahs "bedeviled by the need for over-speedy tangible, immediate, annual showing in terms of miles of roads, numbers of new buildings, thousands of yards of paved drains." "We are exceeding a realistic rate," he concluded sadly in a 1955 letter to Tarlok Singh, secretary of the Indian Planning Commission. There is "a serious deterioration. . . . It is relatively easy to multiply the mechanics of the early prototypes, but not so easy to multiply and reproduce their inner content."

Reflecting on the interaction between his work and the traditional Indian social order – caste, the joint family, the semi-independent village – Mayer observes that if there is nothing to take their place, "then the work of development may have done more harm than good." He confesses that "we who are in the action world cannot tell the fundamental direction in which our work is tending." Quite a confession. In Mr. Mayer's "action world" there is no attempt to confront the fact that India's is the world's most rigidly stratified social setting. Thus we learn that wheat-yields in the project area increased by 2,000 tons per year: we do not learn the caste and land ownership pattern of the area, and so have no way of knowing who profited from the increase. The assumption is that an economic revolution inevitably becomes in time a social revolution. But the evidence in India, where caste provides built-in battlements for economic and political rivalry, leaves this very much of an open question.

Taya Zinkin's readable essays are focused sharply on the social changes going on beneath the political surface. Aside from casually observing that the population problem "threatens the nation with slow strangulation" (and a brief concluding chapter arguing "the irrelevance of Communism"), Mrs. Zinkin, a contributor to the *Guardian* and the *Economist*, doesn't talk politics at all. Having set out to write a book which will outlast next month's headlines, she searches for the essential social transformations taking place in India – the "spectacular emancipation" of women ("women in India have no need to fight for recognition; men are quite ready to make room for them"). Caste, she discovers, is in the process of coalescence from myriad tiny sub-castes to larger groupings: "Underneath . . . a new social structure is emerging based on new and streamlined caste boundaries . . . perhaps even more forbidding than the old ones."

The most original part of the book is her delineation of the "leaders of social change" – Mr. Mayer's village extension worker; schoolteacher; civil servant; Army officer, and technician, "the man with a low-grade degree who does in India what is done in the West by a foreman or skilled laborer" and thus makes manual labor acceptable to his caste. Above all,

> ". . . the ever-growing vanguard of businessmen who are managers. They bring to their new position of responsibility a strong sense of patriotism. As managers grow in number and stature, their impact on Indian thought will be tremendous. They are the brothers, the first cousins or the second nephews of the civil servants and the politicians . . ."

The most dynamic element in the towns is the young clerk – the white-collar worker who leaves his social past behind, unlike the typical Brahmin clerk who is Western during his daytime work but a Brahmin in his home ("When I put on my shirt, I take off my caste, and when I take off my shirt, I put on my caste").

Mrs. Zinkin's interpretation of Indian family life is uncritically sympathetic. She idealizes "the warmth of belonging" in the Indian village with little or no attention to the meannesses – the inherently difficult position of the daughter-in-law, for example, in joint family life. True, "in India . . . nobody has to fight to get accepted; everybody belongs from birth." But the same thought is handled with greater balance by Margaret Parton when she takes us to the logical conclusion of such strong in-group loyalties – "more loving-kindliness within a family (and perhaps within a caste) in India than there is in the West, less between strangers and out-family people."

The Leaf and the Flame is personal history but it is also a small triumph of engaging and indirect political commentary. Although Miss Parton, a former *New York Herald Tribune* correspondent, also minimizes Communist prospects in India, she accomplishes this through the political odyssey of a young Indian friend named Sesh (short for Attur Pattabhi Seshadri Ayyar), who turns up in the early pages of the book, at a Soviet Embassy reception, as a young

The Lovers

Above, through lunar woods a goddess flees
Between the curving trunks of slender trees;
Bare Mazda-bulbs outline the bone-white rooms

Where, on one elbow, rousing by degrees,
They stare, a sheet loose-folded round their knees,
Off into space, as from Etruscan tombs.

WILLIAM JAY SMITH

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist; reappears 16 pages later as a militant pro-American (having found a job on a pro-US newspaper); carries on so among the liberated coeds of Westernized New Delhi that he bounces back to a kind of Gandhian austerity; and ends up, about page 200, as a busy and well-adjusted official at a refugee resettlement project. The moral is that Indian Communism with its middle-class appeal (for middle-class young men who would really rather not be Communists, given half the chance) is made of somewhat flimsy stuff.

Miss Parton's political comment never gets in the way of her easy narrative. And with the exception of one notable lapse into sentimentalism ("India is a country which makes you want to be good, yes, to be noble"), she speaks as the uncommitted observer. Gandhi was "a revered name in the Quaker household of my childhood." But, we are told matter-of-factly, she found that Gandhi did not really want to change the caste system, for all of his attention to the "uplift" of the untouchables; that his attitude here, as in matters of economics, was "let's clean up the status quo and keep it." Still, he had a once-in-a-generation political talent for bringing out the best in his country. He employed

> "... the trick of telling people that they are already the kind of people one hopes privately they will become. If materialism and greed are evident in people, you tell them they are spiritual. If violence possesses their hearts, you tell them they are peaceful. It's a little like talking to a naughty but beloved child: 'You're a very *good* child, aren't you? You wouldn't *dream* of pulling up the flowers, would you? No indeed, you *love* flowers!' This is not as silly as it sounds, for when it came to Gandhi, the Indian people were his children."

In contrast to Mrs. Zinkin's sobriety, *The Leaf and the Flame* is written with light irreverence. "All of India is awake now," a young Congress Party leader informs Miss Parton over a glass of warm pineapple juice. "The people are throbbing with new life, conscious of freedom, progress and democracy."

"Politicians talk like that in India," she explains, "even in private conversation. It is one of their most endearing characteristics, if you are feeling strong."

NEW **RANDOM HOUSE** BOOKS FOR BOYS AND GIRLS

Landmark Books

5 NEW LANDMARK BOOKS

Stonewall Jackson *by Jonathan Daniels*
The Battle for the Atlantic *by Jay Williams*
The First Transatlantic Cable *by Adele Gutman Nathan*
The Story of the U. S. Air Force *by Robert Loomis*
The Swamp Fox of the Revolution *by Stewart Holbrook*

5 NEW WORLD LANDMARK BOOKS

Chief of the Cossacks *by Harold Lamb*
The Adventures of Ulysses *by Gerald Gottlieb*
William the Conqueror *by Thomas B. Costain*
Jesus of Nazareth *by Harry Emerson Fosdick*
Julius Caesar *by John Gunther*

Ages 10-16. $1.95 each

All about Books

4 NEW TITLES

All About the Jungle *by Armstrong Sperry*
All About Prehistoric Cave Men *by Sam and Beryl Epstein*
All About the Ice Age *by Patricia Lauber*
All About Archaeology *by Anne Terry White*

Ages 10-14. $1.95 each

Legacy Books

A new series of exciting new versions of the great and enduring myths, legends and folk tales of long ago, retold by famous storytellers of today. Printed in large, clear type and illustrated in color by outstanding artists.

For ages 9 to 12.

$1.50 EACH

The Gods of Mount Olympus *by Robert Penn Warren*
The Golden Fleece *by John Gunther*
The Trojan Horse *by Shirley Barker*
The Voyages of Ulysses *by Clifton Fadiman*
Aladdin and the Wonderful Lamp *by Anne Terry White*
Thor's Visit to the Land of the Giants *by Nancy Wilson Ross*
The Sword of Siegfried *by Katharine Scherman*
Robin Hood *by Orville Prescott*
Paul Bunyan *by Maurice Dolbier*
Cupid, the God of Love *by Frances Winwar*

Looking Glass Library

A new series of inexpensive editions of great works of children's literature which have been out of print or difficult to obtain in bookstores. Whenever possible, the original illustrations will be used. Phyllis McGinley, W. H. Auden and Edmund Wilson are the consulting editors. 5 x 7½, paper over boards, 300 black-and-white illustrations throughout, four-color covers. Smythe sewn. Ages 8 and up.

$1.50 EACH

Five Children and It *by E. Nesbit*
The Blue Fairy Book *by Andrew Lang*
The Princess and the Goblin *by George McDonald*
Men and Gods *by Rex Warner*
Wild Animals I Have Known *by Ernest Thompson Seton*
The Peterkin Papers *by Lucretia Hale*
A Book of Nonsense *by Edward Lear*
Looking Glass Book of Verse *edited by Janet Adam Smith*
The Haunted Looking Glass *12 Ghost Stories edited by Edward Corey*
The Lost World *by Arthur Conan Doyle*

Published by THE LOOKING GLASS LIBRARY, Distributed by RANDOM HOUSE

NOW AT YOUR BOOKSTORE, **RANDOM HOUSE,** NEW YORK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sensational New Revelations on The FBI and the Witch Hunt

In two striking special issues, *The New York Post and J. Edgar Hoover* (Nov. 2) and *J. Edgar Hoover and the Witch Hunters* (Nov. 9), I. F. Stone's Weekly has broken new ground and presented fresh material on the subject American newspapers are most afraid to write about.

The most important revelations deal with the well hidden liaison over the years between the FBI and the various Congressional and State investigators of "Un-American activities." The documented material includes admissions of these ties by Senator Mundt and J. Parnell Thomas.

These are issues every thoughtful American concerned with the preservation of fundamental liberties will want to read and to file away for future reference. You can still get these two issues free by using the blank below to enter a one-year subscription at only $5 to America's boldest Washington newsletter, now entering its eighth successful year of publication.

For News and Opinion You Won't Find Elsewhere

I. F. STONE'S
WEEKLY

5618 NEBRASKA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON 15, D. C.

For the enclosed $5 send me free the two FBI issues and enter a one-year subscription to *I. F. Stone's Weekly.*

NAME.....

ADDRESS.....

CITY.....ZONE....STATE.....

A Little Respect, There!

National monuments ought to be protected, and something ought to be done about Gary Cooper. Two new Cooper films demonstrate that producers are using this venerable gentleman shamelessly, consigning him to physical hardship of a dreadfully strenuous sort for a senior member of the firmament. It ought to stop.

It is just painful to see a dignified man of almost sixty being dragged a hundred yards on his face by a run-

They Came to Cordura
(Columbia)
The Wreck of the Mary Deare
(MGM)

away railroad handcar; or socking and being socked; or diving in a frogman's suit and getting into an underwater fight. No matter that doubles are employed for the really rough stuff and that clever cutting helps the rest; it's the idea of the thing that's upsetting.

No well-known Hollywood celebrity can age privately. We know how old Gary Cooper is by our own ages. How many of us took our first high-school dates to a Cooper film. How many people – all over the globe – were born, grew up, and became parents during his reign, cannot remember a time when there was no Gary Cooper and possibly cannot conceive of a time in which he will not exist. For their sakes, he must be preserved as long as possible. He has earned and worn out his spurs – dozens of pairs. *Let him sit down.*

There will be many more Cooper pictures, we hope. The lean, reticent, slightly worried but resolute, gratifyingly long-legged figure would be much missed. No argy-bargy over his acting ability is necessary or appropriate; he is not primarily an actor, he is the incarnation of an American myth. He is what every American boy wants to look like and wants the rest of the world to think Americans look like. But the incarnation is mortal. Twenty-three years ago Cooper made a picture in which, as the perennial wholesome Yank, he gets involved with Marlene Dietrich, a jewel thief, in Spain. After a night with her, he is awakened by her associate (John Halliday) who wants to get him out of the house. "Come along," says Halliday. "You said you've wanted to see Spain ever since you were a little boy." Sleepily and blissfully, Cooper replies, "I'm not a little boy any more."

Gentlemen of Hollywood, he is not a two-fisted brawler any more. It hurts – it actually hurts the viewer's joints and back – to see him pretend to his earlier admirable activity. Take an example from Clark Gable, his exact contemporary (both born in 1901). In his new film *But Not for Me*, although it is a stiff and stagy comedy, Gable's senior status is recognized, even made agreeable game of. We demand equal recognition for Cooper.

The first new Cooper film, *They Came to Cordura*, is another variation on the Lost Patrol theme – an isolated group of men and how hardship reveals their true characters. (A girl has been added to this particular group as variation and catalyst.) Several American soldiers, members of the punitive expedition into Mexico in 1916, cross the desert under Cooper's command. He is an awards officer who has selected these men for Medals of Honor and is charged with taking them out of battle and getting them back alive. He has (secretly, he thinks) committed an act of cowardice; they are all heroes. But under the strain of the desert passage . . . ah, well. I mustn't spoil the ending.

The idea of character reversal under stress is always viable. (The last good

"CHINA' IS NOT *a mere puppet of Russia, like Bulgaria or Albania, but a junior ally. As against the West, there is no international breach between the two, nor will there be within the useable future. Peiping and Moscow function as two non-identical but complementary arms of the single anti-Western world revolution. They will not, and indeed they cannot try to cut each others' throats until they have finished cutting ours.*"

From the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. Write to Dept. N-A, 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N. Y., for free copy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

example I can remember is the French *Wages of Fear.*) Cooper is his appealing, though quasi-arthritic self, and Van Heflin is an effective menace. But the picture fails of conviction because of sententiousness, protraction, and the performances of the rest of the cast, headed (if that is the word) by Tab Hunter and Rita Hayworth.

The Wreck of the Mary Deare brings us Cooper as a ship's captain discovered by Charlton Heston, a tugboat man, aboard an otherwise abandoned freighter in the English Channel. Heston helps him get up steam, then learns that the captain is steering on to a reef. Subsequently we find out why.

That is the trouble with the picture: it splits neatly into half-puzzle and half-explanation, and the puzzle is much more interesting. But there is a nice hint of *Lord Jim* in the theme, and the early part of the film creates strikingly a sense of the hugeness of the ship, in relation to the two solitary men trying to maneuver it, and of the thundering sea.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

East-West Negotiations

Sirs:

An editorial in your November 2 issue entitled "Relaxation for What?" attributes to me three quotations to the following effects: (1) The unacceptability of a ban on testing of small nuclear weapons, (2) the danger to us of a negotiation over thermonuclear armament "under our current defense policy," and (3) the probable unacceptability to the West of any price for a German settlement acceptable to the Russians. I raise no questions about (3). In the original context, however, (1) referred to a hypothetical negotiating issue, the underlying hypothesis of which you do not mention, and (2) was part of a criticism of, and its idea contingent upon, the strategic inflexibility inherent in the massive retaliation doctrine, which was our "current defense policy." The article from which both (1) and (2) were seized out of context was devoted to a proposal for negotiating an abatement of the thermonuclear peril. Moreover, my views on the ill effects of the massive retaliation doctrine on our negotiating position are quite similar to views stated by George Kennan in the very speech which you cite as representing an adversary position. May I counsel you to less zeal to make a doubtful point, more care with the scissors, and a more discerning eye for the context of what you quote?

Paul H. Nitze
Washington, D. C.

In reply:

In his closely-reasoned paper, "An Alternative Nuclear Policy as a Base for Negotiations" (*East-West Negotiations*, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Second Edition, 1959), Mr. Nitze presents a definitive statement of the view that significant negotiations with the Soviet Union must await a new United States defense policy – which is to imply, a new Administration.

"As long as massive retaliation in its present form remains the primary military foundation for Western defense policy," he writes in the introductory paragraph of his paper, "there is little of true significance that we can negotiate about. Most of the things for which there is both public support and Soviet willingness to negotiate are likely to constitute the thin edge of a wedge which, if driven one step further, would knock the foundations out from under our current defense policy."

In place of the massive retaliation doctrine he suggests a new "proposal . . . that we make one and only one exception to the general rule that nuclear weapons should not be used by anyone at all and that the purpose of nuclear armaments should be solely to see that they are not used by others. This one exception would be that any country which is militarily attacked by forces crossing its borders can, if it wishes, *unilaterally* use nuclear weapons within its own borders to repel and drive out the aggressor and can also call for and receive the support of the United States and all other nations proposing to support the provisions of the United Nations Charter."

Implicit in this proposal is a change in emphasis "from negotiations with the

EUROPE
We'll see the usual plus Russia, Scandinavia, Yugoslavia & N. Africa. A different trip—for the young in spirit who don't want to be herded around. Also shorter trips. Budget priced.
EUROPE SUMMER TOURS
255 Sequoia, Box N — Pasadena, California

TEACHERS . . . STUDENTS
We offer a comprehensive selection of quotations relevant to the question of labor-management relations, as well as a sizeable bibliography, glossary, and discussion of historical background. $4.25
CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
Room 301, 4 Brattle Street, Cambridge 38, Mass.

UNITY FOR HUMANITY wishes to bring to your attention Brock Chisholm's article, "Reduction of International Tensions," September (1959) issue *BULLETIN of the Atomic Scientists.*
C. C. Wilson, Director Danville, Illinois

EXPERIMENT WITH "SLEEP-LEARNING"
Self-hypnosis. Use your phonograph, recorder. Fascinating, educational. Details free.
Sleep-Learning Research Association
Box 24-NR Olympia, Washington

JOBS ABROAD FOR TEACHERS, writers, librarians, translators, stenographers, and administrators. Top salaries paid by American and foreign companies, governmental and international organizations. How, when and where to apply, $1.00. Included free "Student Opportunities Abroad." Dorf, 186-NR, Covington Lane, Woodbury, N. J.

OUT-OF-PRINT BOOKS
Name the book—we'll find it for you! All subjects —no obligation to buy. Write Books-On-File. Dept. NR, Union City, New Jersey.

INFORMAL SKI CLUB
in NYC has rented large house in southern Vermont. Seeking unmarried members (21-35). For information phone JE 8-5182, MU 6-5128 or UN 4-2261, Evenings.

FREE BOOK-BARGAIN LISTS
in history, politics, Americana.
Flushing Books, Department D
67-12 136th St. Flushing 67, N. Y.

WE MOVE YOU WITHOUT TEARS
Economical, insured household moving. Vans, station wagons. Any time, any place. The Padded Wagon, AL 5-8343 (NYC)

BRITISH SHOES FOR GENTLEMEN at a fraction of their American retail price! $10.95 includes duty and import charges. Delivery in ten days from receipt of order. Unconditional money back guarantee. Write for free illustrated catalogue. Steven Williams, Jr., Ltd., 40 Chatham Road, Short Hills, New Jersey.

A FRESH READING EXPERIENCE
"Weeklies" Club sends different weekly newspaper every other week. Country flavor, distinguished editing, novelty, charm, romantic places. Charter Series. Six mailings, $2.29. Zodiac Series, Twelve mailings, $4.50. Gift Card.
Box 78, NR, New Rochelle, New York

PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANCE
IN WRITING, REWRITING, EDITING
Stories, novels, books, articles.
Manuscripts marketed. Brochure Free.
PUBLISHER'S AGENCY
33 West 42nd St. New York 36.

Printed by National Publishing Co., 301 N St., N.W., Washington 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russians to negotiations with our allies and friends." The US would be able to bargain with the Soviets from a position of sufficient strength "only after we had worked these issues out with those whose interests it is we are trying to defend." And thus: "Some of the things the Russians are now proposing we could not accept. We could probably not accept a ban on the testing of small nuclear weapons; there is still much work to be done if small weapons with minimum radiation hazard are to be developed. We could not accept a complete ban on atomic weapons." (Having once assumed the necessary defense posture, Mr. Nitze then adds, "we could not only accept, but we would be in a position to press for, a great deal" – including bans on "the testing of all but the very smallest weapons" and on "the use of nuclear weapons except in self-defense and within and over one's own territory.")

Clearly, the salient point in Mr. Nitze's presentation, when one considers present and forthcoming East-West negotiations in Geneva and elsewhere, is his very clear statement that "only after" a limited nuclear defense policy has been adopted by the United States and negotiated with our allies should the US accept a complete ban on atomic weapons. This conclusion was not seized out of context but rather singled out as the pivotal, practical point of his argument. It is a position we believe reflects an excess of hope and a minimum of realism. Any policy is a decision to balance one set of risks against another. We have long argued the need for stronger and more varied allied defense forces, capable of responding to limited attacks by means other than "massive retaliation." But at the same time, the danger of proliferating nuclear capability and of fallout requires the West to risk *now* a negotiated agreement for a complete, policed ban on atomic weapons. Unless we entirely misread Mr. Nitze, he would not take this risk "under present circumstances."

Finally, nowhere did *The New Republic* editorial of November 2 suggest that Mr. Nitze and George Kennan were adversaries on the particular issue of the "ill-effects of the massive retaliation doctrine." Indeed, the editorial noted that each "would agree that the United States has relied too heavily on the nuclear deterrent." – THE EDITORS



The New Republic's paid circulation has increased in the past eight weeks by more than 25 percent. It is not yet 100,000. But it could easily be 50,000 by January 1 with the help of our subscribers. Many have written to say how pleased they are by the new type and design, by Mr. Costello's study of Nixon, TRB's weekly report from Washington, Frank Getlein's sensible talk about art, Gerald W. Johnson's jabs at humbug, Robert Brustein's brilliant comments on the drama, or B. H. Haggin's reviews of recordings. If *you* like *The New Republic*, think of what so many others are missing that *you* can supply them for 1960.

USE THE ORDER BLANK BOUND INSIDE

The Steel Strike

Sirs:

Gerald W. Johnson's article, "Time to Get Up" (November 9) sounds a clarion call to a sleeping America.

There is a middle ground between unlimited war and unlimited arbitration. I suggest that Congress should amend the Taft-Hartley Act by striking out its ineffective "cooling off" provisions. Instead, it should authorize the President, at any time after a strike that seriously injures the nation's economy has run for more than, say, 60 days, to declare the injury to the nation requires that the strike issues be submitted to arbitration, the strikers going back to work with assurance that the arbitration award shall be effective as of the date of their return to work. Like the War Labor Board, the arbitration Board would have on it a representative of labor, another of capital, and a third of the public who would act as chairman. Such a statute would act as a warning to both sides to work out their own agreement -- or else. Some such a remedy is sure to come, as the rest of us lose patience with the growing costs of these wars. Why wait longer?

Benjamin H. Kizer
Spokane, Washington

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED